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11Earlier work on non-profit firms includes Arrow (1963) and Nelson and Krashinsky (1973).
I. Introduction
In 1966, Robert Brustein founded the Yale Repertory Theater -- a non-profit artistic company
with a resident company of actors.  The theater’s revenues came from Yale University, other funding
agencies and ticket buyers.  In 1979, Brustein moved his theater to Cambridge (changing its name
to the American Repertory Theater) to keep it focused on professional, rather than student, drama.
While this theater requires a more permanent commitment (perhaps investment in specific human
capital) from its actors than standard theaters do, it is far from being a cooperative.  Robert Orchard
(managing director of the theater, cited in Ayala and Falstad, 1988) writes “what the company does
ultimately reflects his [Brustein’s] choices, his tastes, his ideals.”   
Many, if not most, not-for-profit firms are started by entrepreneurs. In 1864,   Jean-Henri
Dunant, after witnessing the bloody battle of Solferino, founded the Red Cross.  Dunant co-founded
another significant non-profit, the World’s Young Men’s Christian Association, and (after spending
most of his life in poverty and obscurity having neglected his business affairs) won the first Nobel
Peace Prize in 1901.   In 1892, the American John Muir founded the non-profit Sierra Club.  In recent
years, Michael Brown and Alan Khazei founded City Year, a program dedicated to promoting
national service among young people, and Wendy Kopp founded Teach for America, a non-profit
service organization attracting recent college graduates to teaching disadvantaged students. 
In this paper, we ask a simple question: why would an entrepreneur wish to start a not-for-
profit rather than a for-profit firm?  We present an answer motivated by the work of Hansmann
(1980, 1996) and Weisbrod (1988)1.  Our theory uses the assumption of Hansmann (1996) that “the
critical characteristic of a nonprofit firm is that it is barred from distributing any profits it earns to
persons who exercise control over the firm.”  Instead, a nonprofit firm can distribute its profits only
22Non-profit firms can also retain their profits for long periods of time.  Duggan (1998) shows
that Californian non-profit hospitals have saved rather than spent their windfalls from increased
transfers from the government.  Universities, of course, have retained their income for centuries.  
through improvements in the working environment of the entrepreneur and the employees, which may
include lower effort levels, free meals, shorter workdays, longer vacations, better offices, more
generous benefits, or even improvements in the quality of the product2. In general, such “perquisites”
are not as valuable to an entrepreneur as income, and so it is not obvious why a rational entrepreneur
would constrain himself by choosing a non-profit status.  The key point is that such status weakens
his incentives to maximize profits.  This commitment to weaker incentives is valuable in markets
where entrepreneurs might be able to take advantage of their customers, employees, or donors, since
it reduces their interest in profiting from such opportunities.  When customers, employees, or donors
feel protected by the non-profit status of the firm, the entrepreneur has a competitive advantage in
the marketplace.
We present a model that attempts to capture this idea.  Some of the literature on non-profit
firms, such as Drucker (1990) and Rose-Ackerman (1996), stresses the altruistic motives of its
management.  We agree that many founders of non-profit firms are motivated by public spirit and
altruism, rather than just profits.  At the same time, we believe that one can explain many crucial
aspects of non-profit behavior, including which markets they operate in, without relying on the
assumption of altruism.  Even with the altruism assumption, the question of why an altruistic
entrepreneur chooses the non-profit organizational form remains pertinent. 
The basic idea of our model is well-known from the theoretical literature on incomplete
contracts, including Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Holmstrom (1982), Grout (1984),
Grossman and Hart (1986), and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994).  In some situations,
particularly strong incentives lead to inefficient behavior and cannot be controlled by an explicit
33Similar issues come up in the discussions of government ownership, see Hart, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) and Shleifer (1998). 
4Hansmann (1980), whose views we largely share, uses the general label of “contractual
failure” to explain the benefits of the not-for-profit status.  Hansmann (1996) and Easley and O’Hara
(1983) stress more specifically asymmetric information between consumers and entrepreneurs.  One
way, though not the only way, to interpret the incomplete contracts framework that we rely on is
asymmetric information between the trading parties on the one hand and the judge on the other.  
contract.  Such incentives should be moderated by other means.  In our context, when high powered
incentives resulting from profit maximization can cause entrepreneurs to take actions detrimental to
their customers, such as cost reductions that lead to deterioration of quality, commitment to non-
profit status softens these incentives, and thus reassures the customers that entrepreneurs will not take
advantage of them3.  When quality cannot be part of a contract, such a commitment can benefit both
the entrepreneur and consumers.  Although there are several theoretical ways to make this point, we
choose an ex-post expropriation framework that does not rely on asymm tric information between
the entrepreneur and consumers4. 
Many recent discussions of non-profits have focused substantially on their tax advantaged
status (Weisbrod 1988, Lakdawalla and Philipson 1998).  Our model does not rely on any tax benefits
of non-profit firms to explain their existence.  While the non-profit status brings significant tax
benefits in the United States both for the firms and for the donors, it does not seem to be the essential
characteristic of the non-profit firms.  First, non-profits such as the Sierra Club were created long
before the introduction of the income tax in the United States, and hence are unlikely to be a
byproduct of income taxation. Second, and along the same lines, the vast majority of donors to non-
profit firms in the United States are relatively poor individuals who contribute to religious
organizations and do not derive tax benefits from their contributions.  Third, noncharitable non-profits
cannot receive tax-deductible contributions but still exist.  Fourth, perhaps the greatest contributions
to the non-profits come from the millions of volunteers, who donate non-deductible time rather than
4the possibly deductible money, and who account for nearly 40 percent of the non-profits’ labor input.
The tax story thus does not appear to be at the heart of the matter.  
Finally, unlike much of the recent literature (Hart and Moore 1997, Kremer 1997), we focus
on non-profit entrepreneurs rather than on cooperatives.  The cooperatives literature focuses on the
consequences of collective decision making.  Many non-profits are started by entrepreneurs, and
hence do not face this particular problem. 
Our basic model examines a firm that sells a commodity to a single consumer.  The quality
of this commodity has both verifiable (contractible) and non-verifiable components.  After the sale,
the entrepreneur can exert effort to reduce costs.  As in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), cost-
reducing effort may also reduce the non-verifiable component of consumer quality.  Consumers are
willing to pay higher initial prices if the firm can commit to making less of such cost-cutting, quality-
reducing effort.  As a means of such a commitment, non-profit status ensures higher prices. 
Entrepreneurs choose the non-profit status if the benefits of committing to higher quality outweigh
the costs of having to take their net revenues in the form of perquisites rather than cash.  
Customers may not be the only ones to prefer dealing with non-profit firms.  Employees may
invest more in specific human capital at not-for-profit firms because these firms have less financial
incentive to cut wages or perquisites ex post.  Donors, who may be more important for many non-
profits than customers,  almost never have clear contracts specifying their wishes, are better protected
against expropriation when they give to non-profits.  When customers, employees and donors prefer
to contract with not-for-profit entrepreneurs, the latter can get higher utility by committing to  not-
for-profit status ex ante.  This status commits the entrepreneur to softer incentives and higher quality
and consequently,  in equilibrium, enables him to charge more or get more donations.
The model predicts that non-profit firms play a large role mainly in sectors with opportunities
55Not-for-profit status is only one of many solutions to expropriation problems; reputation-
building, certification, and competition are others.  Sherwin Rosen asked why the sellers of diamonds
do not use not-for-profit status.   The quality of diamonds can be, and often is, certified by the
Gemological Institute of America.  Interestingly, GIA is a non-profit, presumably in part precisely to
assure diamond buyers that its incentives to be corrupted by the sellers are weak.   
for severe ex post expropriation of consumers, employers, or donors.  Sectors dominated by non-
profit firms, such as child care, long term care for the aged, the performing arts, hospitals and schools,
indeed face such expropriation problems.  With child care or schools, parents who pay up front worry
that these institutions may hire cheaper but less competent teachers.  With the performing arts,
performers invest in the theater and the particular performance, and worry about being underpaid or
fired. With universities, donors worry that the money be used to create a permanent testimony of their
largesse.  Weisbrod (1988) discusses the case of long term care for the aged, where for-profit nursing
homes evidently used more sedatives (a cheap way to keep patients calm) than the non-profits -- a
dramatic example of a cost-reducing strategy adversely affecting non-contractible quality.  Hansmann
(1996) presents an interesting application of the same idea to saving and loan mutuals in the United
States.  When these mutuals were founded, the risk of misuse and appropriation of savings of middle-
class consumers was significant, and the mutual status was used in part as a commitment to softer
incentives5.  
Although our basic results are driven by the effect of the non-profit status on incentives, and
do not rely on entrpreneurial altruism, most founders of non-profits -- such as Dunant or Muir -- have
a strong interest in their causes.  We show in an extended model that entrepreneurs with a strong
taste for quality would opt for non-profit status.  When this taste for quality is unobservable, non-
profit status serves as a signal of such taste.   
Finally, we examine general (non-targeted) donations from charitable donors who wish to
improve product quality.  Donations to for-profit firms do not to a first approximation change the
6marginal conditions for production of quality.  However, donations to non-profit firms lower the
marginal utility of revenues and lead to even softer incentives.  Through this channel, unverifiable
quality in non-profits may improve.  In the same spirit, we examine the role of governing boards of
non-profit firms, which are often structured to have very low benefits of perquisites, and also staffed
by donors. 
In the next section, we present a benchmark model in the spirit of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), in which firms sell a product to consumers, but may later choose to cut costs and in the
process reduce non-contractible quality.  This model gives formal conditions under which non-profit
firms dominate a market.  Section III looks at altruistic entrepreneurs.  Section IV discusses the role
of non-profits when potential donors seek to increase the quality of products with their donations.
 Section V concludes. 
 
II.  The Basic Model
In this section, we consider an entrepreneur's decision of whether or not to obtain non-profit
status for his firm as a mechanism of committing to soft incentives.   The technological opportunities
are identical for all firms.  The only difference is that non-profit status limits the ability of the
entrepreneur to distribute profits to himself.   
At time zero, the entrepreneur decides on non-profit or for-profit status.  At time one, the
entrepreneur sells exactly one unit of a good to a competitive market of consumers.  At the time of
sale, the entrepreneur collects the price P and agrees to deliver at time three a product of verifiable
quality Q1.   At time two, the firm has an opportunity to make a cost reducing innovation.  For an
effort cost of E of discovering and implementing the innovation, the costs of production are reduced
by K(E), where K'(E)>0, K"(E)<0, K(0)>0, and K’(0)=4.  The total costs of production are C(Q1)-
76This innovation could be either socially efficient or not.  Some innovations could also
raise quality.  We only focus on innovations that require effort, and reduce both costs and quality.
7 At this point, the assumption of linearity in effort represents little loss of generality since
the functions mapping effort into cost and cost into quality remain sufficiently general.  
K(E), where C(Q1) is the basic cost of producing a good of verifiable quality Q1. Whi e verifiable
quality Q1 is not influenced by the innovation, and hence the entrepreneur does not violate his
agreement with the consumer, total (nonverifiable) quality is reduced to Q1-mE, where m is a
constant.6  In this framework, E and hence the ultimate quality can be perfectly observable to the
consumers.  The key assumption is that consumers cannot go to a court and complain that the firm
has produced shoddy quality, because the court cannot verify the shortfall of quality below the
contracted on level.  An alternative way to specify this model is by relying on asymmetric information
about E and quality, in the spirit of Hansmann (1996), but it seems to us that in many examples, such
as substitution of inferior teachers in schools or use of sedatives in nursing homes, the issue is not
customer ignorance but rather contractual incompleteness.
   Consumers’ utility equals the quality of the good plus net income (gross income minus price
of the good).  Consumers, then, are willing to pay q+Q1-mE for the good, where E is the anticipated
level of unverifiable effort, and q is a constant.  After the entrepreneur chooses E and Q1, e delivers
the good to the consumer at time three.  
The total cash profits of the firm are P- C(Q1)+K(E).  If the firm is for-profit, these profits
are realized as income to the entrepreneur.  If the firm is not-for-profit, the entrepreneur is forced to
spend these revenues on perquisites, denoted by Z.  Entrepreneurs maximize a quasi-linear utility
function:7
(1) Income + V(Perquisites) - Effort = I+V(Z)-E.
In this section and the next, we further assume that V(Z)=dZ, with d<1.  The entrepreneur would
88All the proofs are contained in the Appendix. 
9Our basic model is set up in terms of the choice of quality and price by a selfish entrepreneur
facing consumers.  Some entrepreneurs might choose to have lower prices because they are altruists,
rather have cash than perquisites at the going price for perquisites.   Since the ntrepreneur could buy
many of the perquisites in the open market, receiving compensation in this form is likely to be worse
than receiving cash.     
We begin with the entrepreneur's decision about his effort level, E.  Price P is fixed when the
entrepreneur chooses effort.  Total utility of a for-profit entrepreneur is P-C(Q1)+K(E) E.  In
choosing the optimal effort level, he sets K'(E)=1.  Define Ef as the effort level that satisfies this first
order condition.  
The not-for-profit firm faces a zero profit constraint, which means that total costs-- cash costs
plus spending on perquisites -- must equal cash revenues.  This zero profit constraint defines spending
on perquisites: Z=P- C(Q1)+K(E).  In this case, the entrepreneur chooses the level of effort to
maximize dC[P- C(Q1)+K(E)]-E, and first order condition is  dCK'(E)=1.   We let En denote the level
of effort that solves this equation.  Comparing En and Ef, and using the fact that K(.) is concave,
yields:
Proposition 1: Cost-reducing effort of the non-profit firm is lower than that of the for-profit firm.
The consequent reductions in quality are therefore smaller in non-profits8.
When consumers contract for observable quality Q1, they agree to pay an initial price P, which
(as mentioned earlier) equals q+Q1- mE.  The non-verifiable component of quality is correctly
anticipated by consumers to be lower among for-profit firms.  Holding verifiable quality constant, the
price initially charged by non-profit entrepreneurs is therefore higher9. 
9or because they want to attract donations from donors who are altruists.  In this case, non-profit firms
would receive donations and ration their products, rather than charge higher prices.  
The choice of contractual quality for either for-profit or non-profit firms maximizes Q1 -
C(Q1); this choice yields the first order condition: 1=C'(Q1). Contractible quality does not change
with for-profit status and is denoted   --   and we assume that  > C( ).  The marginal value*1Q
*
1Q
*
1Q
of contractible quality to the consumer equals to the marginal social cost of producing that quality.
Thus non-contractible quality is higher in non-profit firms, but contractible quality is the same.
The non-profit status serves as a valuable commitment to higher quality only if the
entrepreneur cannot pocket the profits by converting the firm to a for-profit status after collecting
the revenues.  Such conversions do occur in the United States, particularly in the hospital industry,
but they restrict the use of profits by the for-profit firm.  If effective, this device eliminates incentive
to convert in order to distribute the profits, although some abuses do occur.  As the law stands, then,
non-profit status is a pretty credible commitment to non-collection of profits by the entrepreneur. 
  What legal status does the entrepreneur choose?  The entrepreneur chooses not-for-profit
status if:
(2)           dC[q+ -mEn-C( )+K(En)]-En    >    q+ -mEf-C( )+K(Ef)-Ef , *1Q
*
1Q
*
1Q
*
1Q
or equivalently
(3) (-mEn+K(En)-En ) - (-mEf+K(Ef)-Ef ) > (1-d)C[q+ -mEn-C( )+K(En)]*1Q
*
1Q
The left hand side of inequality (3) represents the benefits that a for-profit firm would obtain by
committing to the non-profit firm's lower level of non-verifiable cost-reducing effort.   The right hand
side represents the loss imposed on a non-profit firm by the necessity to enjoy profits only as
perquisites.  This comparison represents the fundamental tradeoff between non-profit and for-profit
10
status.   The following proposition describes conditions determining the entrepreneur’s choice of
status:
Proposition 2:   There exists a unique cutoff level of consumer taste for non-contractible quality,
denoted m*, below which all entrepreneurs choose the for-profit status and above which they all
select the non-profit status.
This proposition illustrates the crucial point that  markets for goods where consumers do not
value non-contractible quality would be dominated by for-profit firms, but markets where consumers
do value such quality -- by the non-profits.  When consumers care deeply about non-verifiable quality,
entrepreneurs prefer non-profit status because it allows commitment to soft incentives and brings
higher prices ex ante. The more valuable such quality, the more valuable is the ability to commit.  
  The next proposition derives further conditions on what makes an industry  more likely to be
dominated by non-profit firms.
Proposition 3: 
(a) As the profitability of the entrepreneur or of the industry rises, the non-profit status
becomes less desirable.  More precisely, suppose K(E)=k+( ) an C(Q1)=c+ (Q1).  Then, as qKˆ Cˆ
or k rises or as c falls, m* rises.   
(b) If d is sufficiently low, then the for-profit status dominates the non-profit status. 
According to part (a), when net revenues are high, entrepreneurs prefer for-profit status
because spending these revenues on perquisites is too unattractive.  With heterogeneity in
11
costs among producers, the lower cost ones choose for-profit and the higher cost the non-profit
status.  
One implication of parts (a) and (b) together is that a very profitable firm, for which the marginal
benefit of perquisites to an entrepreneur is trivial, is unlikely to be a non-profit. 
The critical theoretical assumptions of our model are that ex post expropriation (1) hurts the
purchaser (or employee or donor), (2) yields financial returns, and (3) has non-financial costs such
as effort.  Since non-profit status reduces the financial returns, but does not affect the non-financial
costs, it softens incentives and entails less ex post expropriation in any setting that has these three
features. 
Market Equilibrium
When consumer tastes and the producer technology are homogeneous,  inequality (3) either
holds or fails for all possible entrepreneurs.  As a consequence, all firms in an  industry choose the
same status.  Indeed for profit firms almost completely dominate some industries (automobile
manufacture), while non-profits dominate others (child care).  On the other hand, in some industries,
such as healthcare and theatres, for-profit and non-profit firms coexist. One possible reason for such
coexistence is heterogeneity of consumer tastes.   Assume, as an illustration, that (3)  holds for most
consumers and most firms choose non-profit status.  If a small fraction of consumers receive no utility
from non-contractible product quality, then for-profit firms would enter and supply just these
consumers.  Two types of firms then coexist in equilibrium: for-profits and non-profits, with the latter
catering to consumers who demand high quality.   
Co-existence of the two types of firms in equilibrium can also arise because of heterogeneity
of employment relationships.  For example, repertory theaters might need the non-profit status to
12
10A further problem is that these studies focus on quality from the perspective of patients,
whereas the relevant perspective might be that of the doctors.
commit to good treatment of actors who make large investments in their jobs, whereas more
conventinal theatres do not rely on such investments, and hence can be for-profit.  Hospitals to a
significant extent cater to the interests of the doctors who treat patients there (Pauly and Ledish 1973,
Herzlinger and Krasker 1987).  If hospitals are organized as for-profit institutions, doctors may be
concerned that the profits would be expropriated by the owners, whereas the non-profit status may
serve as a commitment to spend the profits on wages and perquisities for doctors, including research.
 This argument would suggest that doctors who care the most about perquisites would gravitate
toward non-profit hospitals.   This argument would also suggest that, as profitability and hence the
perquisite potential of hospitals declines, the attractiveness of the non-profit status declines as well.
 Consistent with this view, a significant number of non-profit hospitals have recently converted to a
for-profit status nder revenue pressure from managed care providers (Cutler and Horwitz 1997).
 The more general message here is that the analysis of the quality of hospitals for the doctors may be
as important as that for the patients. 
Even when markets are divided between for-profit and non-profit firms, it will be difficult to
distinguish empirically between the quality of their output.  The reason is that both types of firms
would produce output of the same contractible quality, but non-profit firms would choose higher non-
contractible quality.  To the extent that non-contractible quality is hard to put in a contract and verify
in court, it may also be difficult for an econometrician to measure.  This may explain why some
comparative studies of quality across for-profit and non-profit firms such as hospitals had trouble
identifying any differences in observable quality (Norton and Staiger 1984)10.
One potentially interesting dimension of heterogeneity among consumers is the difference in
13
the ability to monitor suppliers.   Consumers who are bad at monitoring would then  select non-profit
firms to deal with.  If governments are particularly weak at monitoring contracts (because of their
own well known incentive problems), they will specialize in dealing with non-profit firms.   
Examples and Discussion
Not for profit status is not the only means of softening incentives.  Other institutional
arrangements may supplement (or replace) it.  For example, entrepreneurs with a particularly low
known taste for perquisites, or whose consumption of perquisites can be restricted by a higher
authority, might make particularly effective operators of non-profit firms.  This may be the reason
why so many non-profits such as schools and hospitals are per ted by or affiliated with particular
religions that restrict consumption.   
Another device that serves the same purpose is a governing board consisting of people who
are unable to consume perquisites, uninterested in the consumption of perquisites, or, perhaps ideally,
are donors to the institution and therefore have an interest in restricting the consumption of
perquisites.  In fact, not-for-profit institutions typically have such governing boards.   The benefits
of the not-for-profit status for quality, then, can be amplified through additional devices reducing the
value of perquisites to the decision makers. 
Two further mechanisms that can help guarantee quality in either for- or not-for-profit firms
are reputations and ex post competition.  If a firm can establish a reputation for producing high
quality and not engaging in cost and quality reducing innovations, it may be able to attract consumers
at high prices regardless of its status.  American universities, for example, try hard to maintain
reputations for quality, as do the for-profit luxury car-makers.
   Competition may further the same goal as well.  Consider the ex post appropriation problem
14
that results from worker investment in specific human capital (as in Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990).
A firm can protect the worker by locating in an area where a large number of other employers also
demand this particular form of human capital.  When competition reduces risks of ex post
appropriation, competition among for-profit firms may again render non-profit status unnecessary.
Silicon Valley is a good example of this phenomenon.   In the absence of such competition, however,
the non-profit status becomes all the more essential.  For example, universities in the US have
traditionally served local markets (Hoxby, 1997) and only one university of a particular quality level
often still serves a given metropolitan area.  There is then little local competition for the services of
professors who invest heavily in university-specific human capital.  If universities were able to
expropriate he rents from such investments, professors would refuse to invest.  Non-profit status
protects professors against this problem.  
These examples raise the obvious question: what are the markets in which reputation and/or
competition suffice for quality assurance by for-profit firms, and what are the markets  where the not-
for-profit status is necessary?  Non-profit status is usually only necessary when the potential
expropriation problem -- and the disutility to consumers or donors from reduced quality -- are very
large.   In the case of donations in particular, where the donor cannot take the money back or switch,
the non-profit status might be essential.  This logic might explain why we see non-profit hospitals
(they deal with life and death and rely on donations) but not non-profit doctors (it is easier to switch
or get a second opinion, and there are no donations).  This logic might also explain why universities
are non-profit (rely on donations) while vocational schools are not (no donations).  Finally, this logic
might explain why, for most goods where quality matters, market mechanisms are good enough for
assuring quality production by for-profit firms.  
15
11Once we allow entrepreneurs to care about quality, we can write down a simpler model in
which an entrepreneur just chooses the quality level (no effort is spent on cost reduction).  In such
a model, commitment to the not-for-profit status would lead to higher quality levels because
perquisites are not as valuable as income.  We stick with a more complex model to show that a
commitment to the not-for-profit status can benefit even a completely non-altruistic entrepreneur. 
III.  A Taste for Quality
Not-for-profit entrepreneurs often care about the quality of the good they are producing and
not just the cash or perquisite returns.  Indeed, many entrepreneurs who start non-profits appear to
be do-gooders and idealists who genuinely care about their altruistic causes (Rose-Ackerman 1996).
At the same time, Bill Gates appears to care deeply about making computing easy for everyone, yet
Microsoft is a for-profit firm, so having a mission is not in itself the whole story.  In this section, we
describe some issues arising from entrepreneurial taste for quality.
We begin by assuming that entrepreneurs’ taste for producing a quality product is observable
and ask whether entrepreneurs with a greater taste for quality are more likely to cho s  non-profit
status.   We assume that the utility of an entrepreneur is:
(1')  Income +d•Perquisites+a•Quality - Effort=I+dZ+a(Q1-mE)-E.
Otherwise, the model is exactly the same as that in the previous section11.  I  choosing the optimal
effort level, the for-profit entrepreneur sets K'(Ef)=1+am.  The non-profit entrepreneur chooses
d•K'(En)=1+am.  Proposition 1 continues to hold and Ef>En.   
For the purposes of this section, we assume that contractible quality  Q1   is fixed.  The new
condition for an entrepreneur to choose the non-profit status is:
(4) (a+d)[Q1-mEn]-d[C(Q1)-K(En)] -En> (a+1)[Q1-mEf ]-C(Q1)+K(Ef)-Ef .
Since Ef>En, we have: 
Proposition 4: Assume mK'''(E)# [K"(E)]2.  Then increases in altruism (parameter a) ak  it more
16
likely that entrepreneurs prefer the non-profit status (i.e. inequality (4) holds).  If there is a
distribution of degrees of altruism, then the more altruistic entrepreneurs choose the non-profit status
and the less altruistic ones choose the for-profit status.
  
According to this proposition, non-profit firms produce higher quality products, as quality-
altruists actually prefer. This, however, is not true in all cases, because there is a countervailing effect.
Entrepreneurs with a greater taste for quality, which is known to all, may be able to earn greater
revenues, which makes the for-profit status more appealing.  The  technical assumption rules out the
possibility that very high altruism individuals find it unnecessary to use non-profit status to commit
to high quality.  Presumably, Mother Theresa could assure everyone of her commitment to quality
of care for the indigent even if she ran a for-profit firm. 
In many situations, consumers do not directly observe the producers’ commitment to quality.
Non-profit status may then signal that the entrepreneur cares more about quality relative to pecuniary
rewards.  Examples of this inference exist both in the health and the schooling industries, where
consumers may be suspicious of for-profit firms because such firms may be more willing to cut
services to raise profits.   While we do not present a model in which non-profit status serves as a
signal of altruism, such a model is straightforward to construct (the single-crossing property holds
here).  This point suggests that non-profit status is even more important in situations where
individuals' altruism is not readily recognized.
When non-profit status attracts more altruistic producers, prices in non-profit firms need not
always be higher than prices in for-profit firms, despite the fact that non-profits have higher
unverifiable quality.  If altruists care about offering low prices, which many at least claim to, then the
altruistic producers in the non-profit sectors may set prices below those in the for-profit sector.  Of
17
12Weisbrod (1998) reports that private contributions as percentage of all nonprofit operating
expenditures in the United States were 53.5% in 1964, falling steadily to 23.6% in 1993.
course, there would then be queues in the non-profit sector.  Thus Harvard and other top universities
ration the slots in their entering classes, as do some of the non-profit long term care facilities.  An
alternative view is that low prices make administration easier, since there is less need for advertising
and management (since there is always aqueue of customers) and that non-profits set lower prices
to avoid effort.  
In summary, this section has made two points. In general, non-profit firms produce higher
levels of quality and therefore attract entrepreneurs who care about quality more. Non-profit status
may also convey information about the underlying commitment of the entrepreneur to quality
provision. As such, non-profit status is a signal of a taste for quality.  
IV.  Donors
In many situations, nonprofit firms provide charitable services for which they charge below
cost, if anything.  As a consequence,  not-for-profit firms often rely on outside donations for part of
their revenues12. Many individuals, with the help of the tax exemption for charitable donations, are
willing to donate funds. Many donations can be understood as attempts to fund a particular project
or interest of the donor or to gain social standing through displays of wealth and altruism.  Such
donors are best thought of as customers of the non-profit, and thus fit nicely into the model described
above.  The non-profit is supplying the donor with prestige or a very particular service (e.g., a full
time researcher at a distinguished university dedicated to Gender Studies).  The firm has the
opportunity to either comply with the wishes of the donor (glorify her name or fulfill the implicit
agreement) or to renege and simply use the money for other purposes.   While any institution has its
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reputation at stake in such a situation, a non-profit has less of an incentive to completely renege
because of the limits placed on its use of new funds (Rose-Ackerman 1996).  Non-profits have an
advantage with donors, not only because of their tax status, but also because the inability to
personally profit makes the people who run them more trustworthy.  
A large number of donations are general funds given to an institution, not funds give  for a
particular purpose.  In fact, donations sometimes lose their tax advantages when an explicit contract
describing the terms of the arrangement is written.  Moreover, in many non-profit institutions, funds
are substantially fungible, and even specifically targeted gifts can be used for general purposes.  To
understand the role of general gifts to a non-profit institution, we must return to the previous model
and explicitly incorporate an altruistic donor.  Furthermore, we now assume that V(Z) is not linear,
but an increasing, strictly  concave function.
The timing of the model must be adjusted to include a donor.  In period zero, the entrepreneur
decides on the not-for-profit or the for-profit status.  In period one, a donor decides on a level of
general donations, denoted by D. The donor correctly anticipates the effect of his donation on the
future price and the non-contractible quality level.  In period two, the entrepreneur sells the good to
the consumer at a price P and a contractible quality level  Q1.  As in the previous section, we assume
that there is only one possible level of contractible quality.  In period three, the entrepreneur chooses
his effort level E, which in turn determines non-contractible quality.   
We assume that a donor who wishes to improve Q, the overall quality of services provided
by the firm, can only do so through general donations and cannot in any sense contract to directly
induce the firm to deliver a higher quality product. The donor chooses the level of general donations,
denoted by D, to maximize (1-t)(I-D)+F(Q), where I is the donor’s taxable income, t is the tax rate
and F(Q) is an increasing, twice differentiable concave function.  The function F(Q) is meant to
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capture the idea that the donor just wants to see good health, good universities or good theater.  We
assume that there is no competition, so a single entrepreneur is maximizing the utility function
specified previously.  If there is an interior solution for D, the donor sets its level so that
dQ/dD•F'(Q)=1-t.  To ensure that this first order condition is a maximum, we assume that second
order conditions hold.
In a for-profit firm, effort is set so that 1=K'(E).  Increases in income do not change this first
order condition, and donations have no effect on quality.   This conclusion is too strong if the
entrepreneur has diminishing marginal utility of income because of satiation.  However, satiation with
consumption as a whole is likely to set in much slower than satiation with perquisites, and hence for
the comparison of  non-profit and for-profit firms, we can assume constant marginal utility of income.
In a non-profit firm, in contrast, donations influence the marginal utility of perquisites and
thereby affect quality.   To solve the model, we proceed recursively and first solve for effort.  The
first order condition for effort is K’(E)•V’(Y)=1, where we use Y to denote net income: Y =
P+D+K(E)-C(Q1).  We can then use the equilibrium relationship P=Q1-mE to find the relationship
between E and D that incorporates the idea that donations affect the price.    We assume that
K’(E)+[V’(Y)•K”(E)]/[V”(Y)•K’(E)] > m holds everywhere, which means that an increase in effort
does not depress prices and profits so much that the marginal benefit from more effort itself increases.
This condition must hold locally for the equilibrium to be stable.  This condition ensures a unique
equilibrium and that dE/dD<0 -- donations reduce effort and increase quality.  We then have:
Proposition 5: Donations (a) rise as the tax rate increases and  (b) fall one-for-one as the firm obtains
more alternative sources of income or as the price of the good increases.
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13 In addition, donors may fear the ratchet effect whereby their gifts reduce future state
funding.
 Part (a) suggests that tax deductible donations will be higher among donors who face a higher
marginal tax rate.  More importantly, part (b) implies that, as the firm acquires alternative sources of
revenue, donations dry up.  When firms are already rich, donors expect their donations to have less
of a marginal impact on quality-related incentives and contribute less.   Segal and Weisbrod (1998)
find some evidence that donations and sales revenues are indeed substitutes for non-profit firms. 
This result may explain why state-supported institutions receive few donations.  State funding
reduces private donations because private donors do not expect to have much of an impact on
quality.13 In practice, there does appear to be a strong substitution between private charity and state
funding.   City Year, the national service organization founded by Brown and Khazei (discussed in
the introduction), originally faced tremendous difficulties finding private donors to fund its programs,
evidently because it already received sizable public funds.  State universities in the United States have
traditionally been less successful in fundraising than private schools.  Indeed, both Yale and Harvard
received most of their funding from state governments until the first quarter of the 19th century.  The
two schools only focused on private donations after the states cut them off for refusing to cater to
the prevailing religious winds (Hansmann 1990).  More recently, some state universities, in California,
also turned to private donors after state funding became scarcer.  In European countries, which have
a long tradition of government funding of artistic, educational and medical institutions, there is much
less of a tradition of private giving to such firms (until government funds dry up, as they did for
British universities in the 1980s and Finnish musical institutions in the 1990s).  Since the government
has already created soft incentives for state-supported firms, private donors are not needed to further
soften their incentives.
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Proposition 5 also suggests that institutions will put themselves into situations where
donations have a real effect on their incentives.  For example, they may overcommit their resources
so as to become cash poor.  Or, like Harvard, they may restrict the discretion in using their resources
as much as possible and attempt to appear unable to finance worthwhile new ventures without new
donations.  This implication explains why some institutions with extremely lush endowments still
work hard to stay poor on the cash flow basis.  
VI.  Conclusion
Not-for-profit firms are often controlled by entrepreneurs, and not by their employees or
customers.  The decision of entrepreneurs to establish such firms can be understood as an attempt to
commit themselves to ofter incentives.  Soft incentives protect customers, volunteers, donors and
employees of the firm against ex post expropriation. Donors in particular would favor non-profits
with unrestricted donations even if such donations  had no tax advantages because the risk of
diversion of funds is much smaller. While sufficient reputation or competition may  substitute for the
non-profit status, in many cases we still expect entrepreneurs to seek the non-profit status, even if
they are completely self-interested.
This basic framework yields several empirical predictions about non-profit firms.  To begin,
according to the theory, we expect to find non-profit firms in activities where:
1) there exist substantial opportunities for reductions of the quality of the good after it is purchased,
or for other forms of expropriation of consumers;
2) the activity is not too profitable, or -- more importantly -- relies on charitable donations;
3) altruism or public spiritedness are important motivators of entrepreneurs; 
4) it is costly for consumers or employees to change firms they deal with.  
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The need for donations to assure the survival of a business is probably the most important
determinant of the preference for non-profit status, because it is difficult to imagine a market
mechanism that would support donations to for-profit firms.  
Furthermore, in the  activities where for-profit and non-profit firms coexist, we expect the
latter to deliver higher quality to consumers.  At the same time, we expect it to be difficult to detect
such higher quality empirically, because easy to detect quality differences should be equalized through
contracts.  Finally, we expect to find higher levels of perquisites in non-profit firms, which may show
up as better working conditions, wages, and benefits for the employees.   Many of these implications
appear to be consistent with the available evidence, while others are at least potentially testable. 
23
References
Arrow, Kenneth (1963), “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” American
Economic Review 53: 941-973.
Ayala, J. and Falstad (1988) "American Repertory Theatre: 1988" Harvard Business School
Case Study 9-688-120. 
Cutler, David and Jill Horwitz (1997), “Converting Hospitals from Nonprofit to For profit
Status: Why and What Effects?,” Harvard University Mimeo.   
Duggan, Mark (1998),  “Effects of Ownership Structure on Hospital Behavior.” Mimeo, Harvard
University.
Drucker, Peter (1990),  Managing the Non-profit Organization: Practices and Principles, New
York, NY: Harper Collins.
Easley, David and Maureen O’Hara (1983), “The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm,”
Rand Journal of Economics 14: 531-538.
Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy 94: 6 1-719.
Grout, Paul (1984), “Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: a Nash 
Equilibrium Approach,” Econometrica 52: 449-460.
Hansmann, Henry (1980), “The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise,” Yal  Law Journal 89: 835-901.
Hansmann, Henry (1990), “Why do Universities Have Endowments?,” Journal of Legal Studies 19:
3-42.
Hansmann, Henry (1996), The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge, MA: Harvard  University Press.
Hart, Oliver, (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
24
Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1997), “Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership,” Harvard University
Mimeo. 
Hart, Oliver, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1997), “The Proper Scope of Government:
Theory and an Application to Prisons.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1127-1162.
Herzlinger, Regina and William Krasker (1987), “Who Profits from Nonprofits?” Harvard
Business Review January-February: 93-106.
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom, (1991),"Multi-task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
7: 24-52. 
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom,(1994), "The Firm as an Incentive System," Am rican 
Economic Review 84: 972-91.
Hoxby, Caroline (1997), “How the Market Structure of U.S. Higher Education explains College
Tuition,” Mimeo, Harvard University
Klein, Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian, (1978), “Vertical Integration, Affordable
Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2).
Kremer, Michael (1997) “Why are Worker Cooperatives So Rare?” Mimeo, MIT.
Lakdawalla, Darius and Tomas Philipson (1998), “Nonprofit Production, Competition, and
Long-term Care,” Mimeo, University of Chicago.   
Nelson, Richard and Michael Krashinsky (1973), “Two Major Issues of Public Policy: Public Policy
and the Organization of Supply,” in Richard Nelson and Dennis Young, eds., Public Subsidy
for Day Care of Young Children, L xington, MA: D.C. Heath. 
Pauly, Mark and Michael Redisch (1973), “The Not-for-profit Hospital as a Physicians’ 
Cooperative,” American Economic Review 63(1), 87-99.
25
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1996), “Altruism, Non-Profits, and Economic Theory,” Journal f
Economic Literature 34: 701-728.
Rotemberg, Julio and Garth Saloner (1990), “Competition and Human Capital Accumulation: A
Theory of Interregional Specialization and Trade,” Mimeo, MIT.
Segal, Lewis and Burton Weisbrod (1998), “Interdependence of Commercial and Donative
Revenues,” Chapter 6 in Burton Weisbrod, ed. (1998), 105-127.
Shleifer, Andrei (1998), “State versus Private Ownership,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
forthcoming.  
Weisbrod, Burton (1988), The Nonprofit Economy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Weisbrod, Burton, ed. (1998), To Profit or Not to Profit. The Commercial Transformation
of the Nonprofit Sector, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
26
Appendix:  Proofs of Propositions
Note:  Throughout this appendix we assume that q+-C( )>0, K(0)>0 and K'(0)=4. *
1Q
*
1Q
Furthermore, we denote H=q+-C( ).*
1Q
*
1Q
Proposition 1:  The first order condition determining innovative effort for the non-profit firm is
dK'(E)=1.  Differentiating  with respect to d yields ME/Md=-1/d2K"(E)>0.  Thus, the level of E chosen
when d=1, the case of a for-profit firm must be higher than the level of E chosen when d<1 (the case
of a non-profit firm).  Ex-post reductions in quality rise linearly with E so the for-profit firm makes
greater reductions in quality.
Proposition 2: If we define:
(A1)    W(m)=(1-d)H+K(Ef)-(1+m)Ef-dK(En)+(1+dm)En= B+(d En-Ef)m
as the difference between entrepreneurial utility with for-profit status and with non-profit status.  The
term B is a combination of terms that are independent of m.  As the effort terms do not depend on
m, W'(m)=dEn-Ef<0, so W(m) is linear, and for sufficiently large levels of m, W(m)<0.  Furthermore
W(0)=(1-d)H+K(Ef)-Ef-dK(En)+En=(1-d)H+(1-d)K(En)+(K(Ef)-Ef)-(K(En)-En))>0.  This in equality
holds because 1>d, H>0, K(En)>0, as Ef is chosen to maximize K(E)-E, it must be that K(Ef)-Ef
$K(En)-En.   As W(0)>0 and W, is continuous and monotonically decreasing and W(X)<0 for some
sufficiently large enough X, there must exist an m* such that W(m*)=0 and non-profit status
dominates for-profit status for all m>m* and for-profit status dominates non-profit status for all
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m>m*.    More precisely m*=B/(Ef-d n)>0, and variables that increase or decrease B, without
changing Ef-d En, also increase or decrease m*.
Proposition 3:  Part (a):  Changes in q, k and c do not affect the choice of effort level or verifiable
quality.  Differentiation reveals MB/Mq>0, MB/Mk>0 and MB/Mc<0 so Mm*/Mq>0, Mm*/Mk>0 and
Mm*/Mc<0.  
Part (b):  At d=0, W(m) equals the profits that would be made by the for profit firm, which are
assumed to be positive, so for-profit status is strictly preferred.  As W is continuous in d, for values
of d close to zero W(m) will also be positive.  
Proposition 4:  Define the utility advantage of choosing for-profit status as:
(A1') W(a)=(1-d)H+K(Ef)-(1+m+am)Ef-dK(En)+(1+dm+am)En
Differentiation, and using the first order conditions that determine effort, reveals that W'(a)=m(En-
Ef)+m
2(1/K"(En)-1/K"(Ef)).  As long as X+m/K"(X) is rising in X (which requires that
K"(X)2>mK'''(X)) then W'(a)<0 since En>Ef.  
Proposition 5:  Part (a) follows since the first order condition for the donor is that F'(Q)dQ/dD=1-t.
Differentiating this condition implies that dD/dt=-1/[F"(Q)(dQ/dD)2+F'(Q)d2Q/dD2].  The
denominator of this expression is negative because we assume that second order conditions hold.
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To prove part (b) of the proposition, we define a parameter y which reflects exogenous increases in
the profits of the firm.  In equilibrium, the price must equal q+Q1-mE, where q is a demand shift
parameter.  Total net income for the firm is therefore D+K(E)-mE+y+q+Q1-C(Q1) which we again
denote Y.  Differentiating K'(E)V'(Y) reveals that as long as K'(E)+[K"(E)V'(Y)]/[K'(E)V"(Y)]>m
then there is a unique level of effort which satisfies the first order conditions for any given level of
D+y+q; we denote this level of effort as E(D+y+q).  Using  K'(E)+[K"(E)V'(Y)]/[K'(E)V"(Y)]>m,
it  follows that dE/dD=dE/dy=dE/dq<0 (i.e. increases in demand, profits and donations have the same
negative ffect on cost-reducing effort).  The first order condition for the donor can be rewritten as
F'(Q1-mE(D+y+q))mE'(D+y+q)=1-t.  Differentiation of this condition equals reveals that
dD/dy=dD/dq= -1, which means that increases in the price or profits lead to one-for-one reductions
in donations.  
